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Favorable Termination After Freedom: Why Heck's
Rule Should Reign, Within Reason

I. INTRODUCTION

An alleged violation of an individual's legal rights demands an
opportunity for redress. There can be no more equitable
proposition than this, for right and remedy go hand in hand. In a
democratic society, however, the availability and scope of a
remedy is always commensurate with the value society places on
the right at stake. The significant value the American people place
on protecting their federal rights is reflected in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'
The statute provides litigants an avenue by which they may pursue
a civil remedy against actors who, under color of state law, violate
their federal rights.2 The United States Supreme Court has
described the purpose of § 1983 as "interpos[ing] the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's
federal rights.",3 Section 1983 creates a "species of tort liability" to
address this end.4
A peculiar and problematic situation may arise, however, when
a § 1983 plaintiff has a criminal conviction that has never been
Copyright 2010, by THOMAS STEPHEN SCHNEIDAU.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
2. Id. Section 1983 is the descendant of § I of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, also known as the "Ku Klux
Klan Act." MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.fic.
gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sec 19832.pdf/$file/sec 19832.pdf. This Act sought to
stem the tide of lawlessness created by the Klan and other similar groups
through the availability of federal remedies. STEvEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION IN STATE CouRTS 2-2 (1988).
3. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
4. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).
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invalidated. Consider a scenario imagined by Justice Scalia: an
individual is convicted of resisting arrest and sentenced to time in
jail.5 His conviction is not overturned on appeal or through habeas
corpus. 6 He subsequently files a § 1983 action against the officer
who arrested him, claiming his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures was violated. 7 In the underlying
criminal trial, the State carried its burden in demonstrating the
individual "intentionally prevent[ed] a peace officer from effecting
a lawful arrest."8 If the plaintiff were to succeed on his § 1983
claim, he would have to demonstrate that his arrest was unlawful. 9
This showing would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his
[underlying] conviction or sentence.9910 The possibility then arises
that two judicial decisions could reach diametrically opposed
results regarding the same set of operative facts if such a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim was cognizable. If the true
purpose of § 1983 is to "interpose the federal courts,"'" however,
the significance in finding collaterally-attacking § 1983 claims
non-cognizable is magnified when the plaintiff is ineligible for
federal habeas corpus relief and has no other access to the federal
courts.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not settled the issue of
whether a collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim brought by a nonhabeas-eligible plaintiff is cognizable. 12 As a result, the circuit
courts of appeals are split as to the proper course of action, with
some non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs having the chance to succeed
on their claims, 13 while others are categorically denied that
opportunity. 14 This Comment will argue that, if given a full and
5. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 n.6 (1994).
6. This fact is assumed in Justice Scalia's scenario. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Justice Scalia notes that "[t]his is a common definition of that
offense." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.at 487.
11. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
12. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004). The Court has ruled
that a collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim by a habeas-eligible plaintiff is not
cognizable, however, without a showing of favorable termination. See infra Part
II.A.
13. See, e.g., Fuchs v. Mercer County, 260 F. App'x 472 (3d Cir. 2008);
Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2007); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d
300 (5th Cir. 2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998). But see
Menoza v. Meisel, 270 F. App'x 105 (3d Cir. 2008).
14. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008); Powers v.
Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007); Harden
v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65 (2d
Cir. 2001); Carr v. O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1999).
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fair chance to litigate his claim in state court criminal
proceedings,'5 a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff bringing a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 suit should first be required to show a
"favorable termination"' 16 to his underlying criminal conviction.
For equitable reasons, however, the favorable termination
requirement should not apply when state actors withheld
exculpatory evidence from the plaintiff material to his underlying
conviction, and such is not discovered until after the exhaustion of
available remedies in the state criminal appeals process. In this
instance, a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff should be allowed to bring
his collaterally-attacking § 1983 action in state or federal court to
adjudicate his federal claims.
Part II of this Comment outlines the dictum opinions of the
Supreme Court on this issue in Heck v. Humphrey17 and Spencer v.
Kemna 18 and examines the manner in which the federal circuit
courts have interpreted and applied these cases. Part HI discusses
the rationales of the opposing views espoused by Justice Scalia,
Justice Souter, and the federal circuits in light of the history and
purpose of § 1983, state sovereignty interests, and lingering
questions of federal habeas interaction. Part III also discusses the
limitations of utilizing the favorable termination requirement in all
cases of collaterally-attacking § 1983 actions brought by nonhabeas-eligible plaintiffs. Part IV concludes by arguing for the
adoption of a qualified favorable termination requirement to
address the dilemma.
II. FAVORABLE TERMINATION: AN OVERVIEW OF HISTORY AND
REACH

Generally, for a plaintiff to succeed in a § 1983 action, he must
demonstrate that the defendant, acting under color of state law,
15. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982)
(describing a full and fair chance to litigate in state courts as being provided
with minimal procedural due process protections). This is the sense in which this
term will be used for the purposes of this Comment. "A federal court should
assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of
unambiguous authority to the contrary." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S.
1, 15 (1987).
16. A favorable termination in this scenario can be demonstrated through:
(1) a reversal of the conviction on direct appeal; (2) an expunging of the
conviction by executive order. Cf Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994) (stating the favorable termination requirement a habeas-eligible plaintiff
must meet in order to succeed on a § 1983 action).
17. Id. at 477.
18. 523 U.S. 1 (1998).

650

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights.19 A difficult
issue arises, however, when the plaintiff is also a convicted
criminal, and success in his § 1983 action would necessarily
impugn the validity of his underlying criminal conviction.
Members of the Supreme Court addressed such a possibility in
Heck2" and Spencer.
A. Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck, the Justices grappled with the implications of a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim. 22 An Indiana state court
convicted Roy Heck of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his
wife and sentenced him to fifteen years in state prison.2 3 During
the pendency of his criminal appeal and while still incarcerated,
Heck filed a § 1983 action in federal district court, alleging that
county prosecutors and an Indiana State Police investigator
engaged in unlawful investigatory practices, knowingly destroyed
exculpatory evidence and utilized an illegal voice identification
procedure at his trial. 2 Heck requested compensatory and punitive
monetary damages based on these claims. 25 The § 1983 action was
dismissed without prejudice by the district court because its
success would have directly undermined the validity of his
underlying criminal conviction. 26 While awaiting his § 1983
appeal, Heck's criminal conviction was upheld, his first petition
for a writ of federal habeas corpus was dismissed for failure to
exhaust state remedies, and his second petition for a writ of federal
habeas corpus was denied.27 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court on Heck's § 1983 suit,
reasoning that success on the action would necessitate Heck's
and
release from prison, even though no such relief was sought,
28
habeas corpus was the proper vehicle for such a remedy.
Consequently, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether the reach of § 1983 was sufficient to overcome the
19.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).

20. Heck, 512 U.S. 477.
21.

Spencer, 523 U.S. 1.

22. Heck, 512 U.S. 477.
23. Id. at 478.
24. Id. at 479.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The denial of Heck's second petition for a writ of federal habeas
corpus was upheld by the Seventh Circuit. Id.
28. Id. at 480. This is because a state could not, as a practical matter,
continue to keep someone in prison when a civil award makes it monetarily
liable for doing so.
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potential consequences of a collateral attack. In Preiser v.
Rodriguez, the Court previously surmised that Congress intended
state prisoners challenging the "validity of the fact or length of
their confinement" to utilize federal habeas corpus review
exclusively over a § 1983 action. 29 While Heck's § 1983 action
challenged the validity of his conviction, he sought compensation,
not release from jail. 0 In Heck, the Court framed the issue as
"whether money damages premised on an unlawful conviction
could be pursued under § 1983.'
Since Heck was still
incarcerated and thus eligible for federal habeas corpus relief,32 the
Court had to decide whether his collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim
was barred by the availability of an alternate federal remedy.
Writing for the majority, 33 Justice Scalia began his analysis by
pointing out that, in general, a plaintiff need not exhaust alternate
remedies to bring a § 1983 claim. 34 The majority ultimately
decided, however, that a correct handling of Heck's claim for relief
rested not upon the availability of alternate remedies, but rather on
whether such a § 1983 action was even cognizable. 35 Because of
strong policy interests disfavoring the expansion of collateral
attacks, and concerns regarding finality and consistency in
litigation, 36 the Court found the action was not cognizable. 37
The Court's conclusion was grounded in its recognition of a §
1983 action as a "species of tort liability," 38 being most akin to the
common law tort of malicious prosecution.3 9 The Court
highlighted the "hoary principle" that tort actions, and thus § 1983
actions, are inappropriate mechanisms for challenging criminal
convictions.40 Direct appeal, habeas corpus review, and executive
review are the normal avenues by which a criminal's conviction
29. 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).
30. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. Success on his § 1983 claim would have
necessitated his release from jail, however. See supra text accompanying note 28.
31. Heck, 512 U.S. at 480 n.2 (emphasis added).
32. A federal writ of habeas corpus can only be granted to "a person in
custody." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
33. The majority consisted of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Ginsburg and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
34. Heck, 512 U.S. at 480 (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S.
496, 501 (1982)).
35. Id. at 483.
36. Id. at 485.
37. Id. at 483.
38. Id. (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. Id. at 484. The common law cause of action for malicious prosecution
required the plaintiff to show a "favorable termination" to his underlying
criminal conviction to succeed. Id.
40. Id. at 486.
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may be expunged. 4 1 Success in collaterally-attacking tort suits
would allow two diametrically opposed judicial decisions
concerning the same set of operative facts to stand.42 Public policy
interests in finality and consistency of judicial decisions require
that criminal
4 3 convictions be safeguarded from collateral attacks of
this nature.
In light of these concerns, and expanding upon the analogy
between § 1983 and the common law cause of action for malicious
prosecution," the Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
action whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called
into question 4by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.
Consequently, the dismissal of Heck's § 1983 claim was affirmed
because it was collaterally-attacking in nature, and Heck was
a favorable termination to his underlying
unable to demonstrate
46
conviction.
While the Court made clear that this "favorable termination"
showing was not applicable to § 1983 claims that did not
the plaintiff's underlying criminal
necessarily
4 7 impugn
conviction, consensus within the Court splintered when the
question of the favorable termination requirement's applicability to

41. Seeid.at486-87.
42. See id. at 484.
43. Id. at 484-85
44. Id. at 484. Justice Souter found Justice Scalia's analogy of § 1983
claims with the common law tort of malicious prosecution wanting because of
the incongruity in form and requirements of the respective actions. For instance,
Justice Souter noted that the tort of malicious prosecution required the plaintiff
to show the "[a]bsence of probable cause for the proceeding as well as
'[m]alice,' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing the offender to
justice." Id. at 494 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 871 (5th ed. 1984)). Justice Souter
also claimed that "under Reconstruction-era common law," favorable
termination could only be demonstrated if the plaintiff was never convicted at
trial. Id. at 496.
45. Id. at 486-87 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 486-87, 490.
47. Id. at 487.
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non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs arose.48 In a footnote to the opinion,
Justice Scalia argued that the strong policy against collateral
attacks would not be overcome "by the fortuity that a convicted
criminal is no longer incarcerated." 49 Justice Souter, in a
concurrence joined by three other Justices, 5° saw the issue
differently. He reasoned that plaintiffs "outside the intersection of
§ 1983 and the habeas statute, individuals not 'in custody' for
habeas purposes,"' 5 1 are entitled to a federal forum in light of §
1983's history and purpose. 52 The Court previously described the
purpose of § 1983 as "interpos[ing] the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights. 53 In light of the role federal habeas corpus plays as the
"appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of
the fact or length of their confinement,"5 4 Justice Souter posited
that a favorable termination rule should stand only in cases where a
habeas-eligible plaintiff seeks recovery under § 1983. 55 Hence,
while Justice Scalia and the four Justices who joined his majority
opinion found that recovery of damages in collaterally-attacking §
1983 claims was barred because such claims were not
cognizable, 56 Justice Souter and those joining his concurrence
rejected recovery because of the availability of federal habeas
corpus, 57 an alternate federal forum. Although Justice Scalia's
position garnered a majority backing of the Court, the passage of
years brought a change of allegiance within the Court and,
ultimately, confusion within the federal circuits.
B. Spencer v. Kemna
The change of allegiance became manifest in 1998 when the
Supreme Court decided Spencer.58 The action involved petitioner
Randy Spencer's request for the issuance of a writ of federal
habeas corpus to invalidate the revocation of his parole by the
48. Again, though, this was only in the context of a § 1983 claim that would
necessarily impugn the validity of the plaintiff's underlying conviction.
49. Heck, 512 U.S. at490 n.10.
50. The concurring Justices were Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
O'Connor.
51. Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring).

52. Id. at 501-02.

53. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
54. Heck, 512 U.S. at 498 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973)).

55. Id. at 500.

56. Id. at 483 (majority opinion).

57. Id. at 498 (Souter, J., concurring).

58. Spencer v. Kemma, 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
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Missouri Board of Probation and Parole. 59 The Court faced the
issue of whether Spencer's claim was moot because, although
Spencer petitioned for the writ while incarcerated, he was free by
the time the district court addressed his petition. 60 Spencer
assumed that he could not seek relief through a claim for damages
under § 1983 due to the rationale of the majority in Heck, as he had
61
not shown a favorable termination to his underlying conviction.
Spencer utilized this assumption to argue that his habeas claim
should not be considered moot, as he would not have been
guaranteed access to a federal forum if both § 1983 and federal
habeas were foreclosed.6 2 The Court, however, found that Spencer
could only defeat the claim of mootness through a showing of
collateral consequences. 6 3 Because Spencer failed to carry this
burden, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment
dismissing the petition. 64 Once again writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia reiterated Spencer's Heck assumption by cautioning
damages must [not] always and
that a "§ 1983 action 6 for
5
everywhere be available."
Because Spencer chose not to bring a § 1983 action, the Court
was not directly faced with the issue of whether a non-habeaseligible plaintiff could recover damages under such an action
without showing a favorable termination to his underlying
conviction. This did not prevent concurring Justices, however,
from addressing the issue. Justice Ginsburg, who had joined
Justice Scalia's position in Heck, found herself endorsing Justice
66
Souter's view upon further reflection of § 1983's "broad reach.,
Justice Souter, joined by three Justices in his concurrence, 67 again
pointed out in dicta what he believed to be the deficiencies of
59. Id. at 3. Spencer had been convicted "of felony stealing and burglary." Id.
60. Id. at 3, 6. A federal writ of habeas corpus can only be granted to "a
person in custody." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
61. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17. Spencer's claim necessarily impugned the
validity of his parole revocation. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 17. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring).
63. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 10-11, 14. Since Spencer was no longer
incarcerated, the Court required that he demonstrate some other tangible injury
that would result from his parole revocation in order to satisfy Article III's
injury-in-fact requirement for standing. Id.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 17.
66. Id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 503
(Souter, J., concurring)). Justice Ginsburg remarked that "[w]isdom too often
never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." Id
at 22 (quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595,
600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
67. Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Justice Souter's
concurrence.
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applying a favorable termination recuirement to a § 1983 claim
brought by a plaintiff not in custody. According to Justice Souter,
the enforcement of such a requirement:
[W]ould produce a patent anomaly: a given claim for relief
from unconstitutional injury would be placed beyond the
scope of § 1983 if brought by a convict free of custody (as,
in this case, following service of a full term of
imprisonment), when exactly the same claim could be
redressed if brought by a former prisoner who had
succeeded in cutting his custody short through habeas.69
In Spencer, as in Heck, the resolution of whether a favorable
termination requirement was applicable to a non-habeas-eligible
plaintiff in a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action was not necessary
to the holding of the Court. Justice Souter's four-Justice
concurrence, however, coupled with Justice Stevens' dissent
70
subscribing to Justice Souter's position on that particular issue,
shifted what had been a majority backing of Justice Scalia's
endorsement of the favorable termination requirement in nonhabeas scenarios to a five-four "majority" in opposition to such a
requirement.7 1 The changing allegiance on the Court as to the
applicability of the favorable termination requirement soon began
to fracture the decisions of the federal circuits.
C. The CircuitSplit
Currently, the circuit courts of appeals are split on the
precedential value and effect of the "non-habeas" opinions espoused
in Heck and Spencer and the rationales that underlie them.
1. CircuitsEndorsingthe Heck Majority
Several circuits chose to follow the position espoused by
Justice Scalia in Heck. In Figueroav. Rivera, the First Circuit held
that Heck's favorable termination requirement barred recovery on a
§ 1983 claim brought by family members of a convicted murderer

68. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 20-21 (Souter, J., concurring).

69. Id.
70. Id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed Spencer

suffered sufficient collateral consequences to overcome the claim of mootness in
his federal habeas petition. Id. at 23.
71. See, e.g., Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001).
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72
who died in prison during the pendency of his habeas petition.
The court rejected the appellants' argument "that strict application
of Heck works a fundamental unfairness in [the] case," viewing
its decision as necessarily flowing from the holding in Heck.74 The
court was also quick to point out that not requiring a showing of
favorable termination when a convict is no longer in jail would
disregard the established principle that a § 1983 claimant must
establish every element of his claim.75 While the First Circuit was
mindful of the position posited by Justice Souter and endorsed by a
majority of the Court in the dicta of Spencer, it noted that the high
Court directed the lower federal courts to "follow its directly
applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by
pronouncements in subsequent decisions . *...,,76
Thus, the First
Circuit viewed the favorable termination rule's applicability to
non-habeas-eligible
§ 1983 plaintiffs as part of Heck's "core
77
holding. ,
At least one circuit court, the Third Circuit, has found that
Heck's favorable termination requirement applies to collaterallyattacking § 1983 actions brought by criminals whose convictions
never led to imprisonment. 78 As a matter of law, plaintiffs in this
situation were never eligible for federal habeas corpus.79 In Fuchs
v. Mercer County, the plaintiff entered a guilty plea to charges of
disorderly conduct and harassment and accepted a fine after an
altercation with police.8 0 Fuchs argued that the district attorney's
office did not adequately investigate key players in his case, and he
consequently felt constrained to plead guilty to the deal he was

72. 147 F.3d 77, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1998). Family members alleged the
deceased was "framed" for murder by the defendants, resulting in an
"unconstitutional conviction and sentence." Id. at 80.
73. Id.at 80-81.
74. Id.at 81.
75. Id.This statement suggests a state court conviction would have a
preclusive effect on a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action insofar as the
conviction acted as a res judicata bar to relitigating claims in a subsequent
collateral proceeding. The Court in Heck did not address this issue, noting that
"[t]he res judicata effect of state-court decisions in § 1983 actions is a matter of
state law." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 n.2 (1994). For further
discussion ofres judicata, see infra Part III.B.2.c.
76. Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 81 n.3 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997)).
77. Id.at 81.
78. See Fuchs v.Mercer County, 260 F.App'x 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2008).But
see Menoza v.Meisel, 270 F.App'x 105 (3d Cir. 2008).
79. A federal writ of habeas corpus can only be granted to "a person in
custody." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
80. 260 F. App'x at 473.
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offered. 8 ' The court was well aware of the "various opinions"
regarding the applicability of Heck to non-habeas-eligible
plaintiffs.8 2 Still, relying on its own panel decision several years
earlier,8 3 the Third Circuit found that a "guilty plea did not
constitute a [necessary] 'favorable8 4 termination' for purposes of
bringing a subsequent § 1983 suit."
The availability of favorable termination avenues other than
federal habeas corpus supported the ruling of the Fifth Circuit in
Randell v. Johnson.8 5 Randell had been convicted of driving while
intoxicated and sought to challenge the length of his confinement
based on time already served. 86' He was not in prison at the
commencement of his § 1983 claim and argued that the favorable
termination requirement did not apply to him since he was not
habeas-eligible. 8 7 The court found that Heck's bar was unequivocal
88
and extended even to claims by non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs.
Citing the conclusions from several sister circuits concerning
Heck's applicability when procedural vehicles for invalidating the
underlying conviction were lacking,8 9 the court noted that Randell
never demonstrated he lacked avenues of redress in this regard. 90
His sentence could have been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, [or] declared invalid
by a state tribunal
91
authorized to make such determination."
The Eighth Circuit has also recognized the applicability of
Heck's bar in negating collaterally-attacking § 1983 claims by nonhabeas-eligible plaintiffs. In Entzi v. Redman, the plaintiff sought
damages for the loss of sentence-reduction credits for failure to
81. Id.
82. Id. at 474.
83. See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005). The court in Fuchs
noted that it could not overrule one of its prior panel decisions absent an en banc
ruling or an intervening Supreme Court decision. Fuchs, 260 F. App'x at 475.
84. Fuchs, 260 F. App'x at 474.
85. 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 300-01.
87. Id. at 301.
88. Id. Mindful of the deference it owed the land's highest tribunal, the
Fifth Circuit noted, "[W]e decline to announce for the Supreme Court that it has
overruled one of its decisions." Id.
89. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 1999);
Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999); Carr v.
O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999)) (in these cases, the circuits have
found that Heck's favorable termination requirement should not apply when
there are no procedural processes available to challenge a conviction).
90. Id.
91. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Presumably, a
"state court authorized to make such a determination" is, at a minimum, a state
court authorized to hear a state habeas corpus claim.
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participate in a prison-run rehabilitative program for convicted sex
offenders. 92 The court understood the holding of Heck to mandate
rejection of such a claim, despite the fact the plaintiff was no
93
longer in custody, absent a showing of favorable termination.
Recalling the on-point statement in Heck that "the principle barring
collateral attacks .. .is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity
that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated," the Eighth
Circuit reasoned that an explicit overruling of Heck by the
94 A majority
Supreme Court would be necessary to hold otherwise.
95
suffice.
not
of dictum opinions in Spencer would
2. CircuitsEndorsing the Spencer "Majority"
Despite the belief among several circuits in the "binding"
effect of Justice Scalia's position as outlined in Heck, Justice
Souter's position garners an equally faithful following. In Huang v.
Johnson, the Second Circuit found that a mother's § 1983 action
on behalf of her son, seeking to recover damages based on the
allegedly unconstitutional length of his confinement, 96 could
proceed based on the son's ineligibility for habeas corpus, as he
was no longer incarcerated. 97 The court noted it had previously
found Heck's favorable termination requirement was not
applicable to a plaintiff bringing a collaterally-attacking § 1983
claim when his underlying conviction never resulted in
incarceration." As a matter of law, such a plaintiff was never
eligible for federal habeas corpus and consequently would not be
guaranteed access to a federal forum without § 1983. 9 The Second
Circuit analogized that situation with Huang's inability to access
federal habeas corpus because of his release and reasoned that, in
light of Spencer's "majority" view, the favorable termination
requirement should not apply to his § 1983 claim. l'
The Fourth Circuit took a more policy-minded approach when
endorsing Justice Souter's contention in Wilson v. Johnson.01 The
92. 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n.10).
95. Id.
96. 251 F.3d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 2001) (the mother alleged that her son was not
given credit for time served while incarcerated for another incident).
97. Id.at 75.
98. Id.at 74 (citing Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420 (2d Cir. 1999)).
99. Id. A federal writ of habeas corpus can only be granted to "a person in

custody." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
100. Huang, 251 F.3d at 75.
101. 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008).
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plaintiff, upon his release from prison, filed a § 1983 claim
alleging false imprisonment in connection with what he construed
to be an improper prison term resulting from his guilty plea as an
accessory to grand larceny. 10 2 Wilson had filed a previous § 1983
claim while in prison, but that claim was rejected on Heck's
favorable termination grounds.' 0 3 The court stated, "Quite simply,
we do not believe that a habeas ineligible former prisoner seeking
redress for denial of his most precious right-freedom-should be
left without access to a federal court."' 0 4 The Fourth Circuit
emphasized its view that § 1983 should only be limited insofar as it
conflicts with the purposes of federal habeas corpus, 10 5 as was the
case in Heck.106 Otherwise, the court reasoned, § 1983's "sweeping
breadth" guarantees litigants access to a federal forum when they
allege a deprivation of their federal rights by those acting under the
color of state law.' 0 7 Judge Hanson, in a strong dissent, adopted the
position held by several of the circuit courts that Justice Scalia's
footnote ten, as part of the majority opinion in Heck, "is part of the
core holding of Heck by which we are bound."' 0 8 Consequently,
Judge Hanson argued, principles of judicial restraint and
recognition of the position of the Fourth Circuit within the
hierarchical ordering of the federal courts support adherence to
termination requirement until the Supreme Court
Heck's favorable 09
holds otherwise. 1
The practical availability of federal habeas corpus during
incarceration was at the forefront when the Sixth Circuit
considered the issue of collaterally-attacking § 1983 claims in
Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission.110 The
court held that a § 1983 plaintiff who sought damages for the lack
of indigency procedures in connection with his incarceration could
pursue his claim, despite being out of prison, because his time in
prison was not long enough to seek habeas relief. 1 1 The court
reasoned that "[iut seems unlikely that Justice Souter intended to
102. Id. at 264.
103. Id.
104. Id.at 268.
105. Id.
106. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) (describing the case as
"[lying] at the intersection of ...§ 1983, and the federal habeas corpus statute
....

11).

107. Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268.
108. Id.at 269 (Hanson, J., dissenting). Footnote 10 noted that "the principle
barring collateral attacks... is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a
convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n. 10.
109. Wilson, 535 F.3d at 270 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
110. 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007).
111. Id.at601.
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carve out a broad Heck exception for all former prisoners."' 12 The
court viewed adherence to Justice Souter's position as "ordinary
rule refinement" within the appellate system' 13 and remarked that
brushing aside the opinion espoused by a majority of the Justices
in Spencer was "something we decline to do."' "1 4 Ironically,
however, the Sixth Circuit admitted it could dispense with the
issue based on its finding that Powers' § 1983 claim did not
necessarily impugn the validity of his underlying conviction." 5
The weight of authority to be given Spencer's "majority" view
was addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Carr v. O'Leary.116 The
court grappled with the possibility that even if Heck's favorable
termination requirement applied to Carr's collaterally-attacking §
1983 action, the state defendants waived its enforcement by their
failure to timely raise the issue."17 Finding that the defendants
waived their right to seek dismissal based on the plaintiffs
inability to show a favorable termination, the court next inquired as
to whether any overriding state sovereignty interest provided
sufficient grounds for the district court judge to forgive the
waiver. 118 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the dicta in
Spencer cast sufficient doubt on the applicability of Heck's
favorable termination requirement to neate any discretion the
judge would have in forgiving the waiver." 9 A concurrence to the
opinion argued that there was no need to resort to a weighing of
the judge's discretion since the Heck
120 requirement was not
applicable based on the dicta of Spencer.
Like the Sixth Circuit in Powers, the Eleventh Circuit heard a
case in which it found more than one "ustification" for allowing
the plaintiffs § 1983 claim to proceed. 7 In Harden v. Pataki,the
court found, first, that the plaintiffs civil rights claim did not
necessarily impugn his underlying conviction and, second, even if
it did, Heck's favorable termination requirement would not be
applicable since the plaintiff was no longer incarcerated. 122 The
opinion drew from Justice Souter's concurrence in Spencer,
112. Id. This suggests that prisoners who had a reasonable opportunity to
seek federal habeas relief and did not or who did and failed would be barred
from bringing a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action upon release.
113. Id.at 602.
114. Id.at603.
115. Id.
116. 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1999).
117. Id.at 1125-26.
118. Id.at 1127.
119. Id.
120. Id.at 1129 (Ripple, J., concurring).
121. Harden v.Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2003).
122. Id.at 1298.
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reasoning that "Heck should be read as permitting a prisoner to
'bring a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a
conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a
favorable-termination requirement 23that it would be impossible as a
matter of law for him to satisfy."1
Significant controversy remains among the circuit courts of
appeals on the question of the favorable termination requirement's
applicability to a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff bringing a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim. An exposition of the issues at
stake counsels for the adoption of such a requirement, except when
state actors withheld exculpatory evidence from the plaintiff
material to his underlying conviction, and such is not discovered
until after the exhaustion of available remedies in the state criminal
appeals process.
III. THE AVAILABILITY OF § 1983 TO NON-HABEAS-ELIGIBLE
CRIMINALS

The lack of unanimity within the circuit courts of appeals
regarding the reach of Heck's favorable termination requirement
illuminates the need for clarity in discerning the scope of § 1983.
Assertions by some circuit courts that imposition of the favorable
termination requirement on non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs bringing
collaterally-attacking § 1983124actions is part of the "holding" or
"central holding" of Heck
are incorrect. In Muhammad v.
125
Close, a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff brought a § 1983 action
that did not necessarily impugn the validity of a misconduct charge
on his prison record. The Supreme Court noted that "[t]his case is
no occasion to settle the issue" of favorable termination's relation
to collaterally-attacking § 1983 claims by non-habeas-eligible
plaintiffs. 126 Thus the Court admitted a favorable termination
requirement for non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs was not a necessary
consequence of Heck, and27 Spencer's "majority" opinion did not
demand allegiance either. 1

123. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998)
(Souter, J., concurring)).
124. E.g., Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000); Figueroa v.
Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998).
125. 540 U.S. 749 (2004).
126. Id. at 752 n.2.
127. See id Additionally, the make-up of the Court has changed since
Spencer, with the death, on September 3, 2005, of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
agreed with Justice Scalia's position, the retirement, on January 31, 2006, of
Justice O'Connor, who sided with Justice Souter, and the retirement of Justice
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Because the question of whether a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff
bringing a collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim must demonstrate a
favorable termination to his underlying conviction remains
unsettled, it is necessary to dissect the arguments on both sides of
the debate so as to arrive at an equitable resolution to this troubling
controversy. Ultimately, Heck's favorable termination requirement
should be applied to a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff bringing a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim if such a plaintiff was given a
full and fair chance to litigate his claim in state criminal court
proceedings. The history and purpose of § 1983, important state
sovereignty interests, and lingering questions of federal habeas
corpus interaction all lend support to such a rule. An exception to
the applicability of the favorable termination requirement to a nonhabeas-eligible plaintiff bringing a collaterally-attacking § 1983
claim must be granted, however, when state actors withheld
exculpatory evidence from the plaintiff material to his underlying
conviction, and such is not discovered until after the exhaustion of
available remedies in the state criminal appeals process.
A. The History and Purposeof§ 1983 Do Not Counsel Against
Favorable Termination
Justice Souter cites the "history" and "purpose" of § 1983 as
justification for allowing federal claims to be heard in federal
court, even if they are brought by non-habeas-elifible plaintiffs
collaterally-attacking their underlying convictions. 12 He believes a
convicted criminal's federal claims against state actors always
deserve an opportunity to be heard in a federal forum. 129 Justice
Souter describes the absence of such an opportunity as an
"untoward result."' 30 The history and purpose of § 1983, however,
despite some confusing commentary from the Supreme Court over
the years, actually suggest Congress was concerned with providing
to litigants rather than unfettered access to a
a federal remedy
3
federal forum. 1 '

Souter himself on June 29, 2009. Where the balance of thought is within the
Court on the issue is now uncertain.
128. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 501 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
129. See id.at 500-01.
130. Id.
131. Justice Scalia has noted that the "entire landscape" of § 1983 would
appear quite different if the statute's goal was to provide unfettered access to a
federal forum for federal claims. In particular, official immunities would not be
available. Id. at 490 n.10 (majority opinion). For further discussion on official
immunities in § 1983 litigation, see infra Part III.A.2.
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Before demonstrating why the favorable termination
requirement must apply to almost all cases of collaterally-attacking
§ 1983 claims brought by non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs (an issue
that concerns the cognizability of the federal remedy), it is first
necessary to establish that the history and purpose of § 1983
recognize the competency of state courts to resolve the federal
issues at stake. For if § 1983 demands the availability of a federal
forum because state courts are necessarily inadequate venues for
resolution of these federal issues, collaterally-attacking § 1983
claims brought by non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs must be
cognizable.
1. ConcurrentJurisdictionOver § 1983 Claims Illustrates
State Court Adequacy
The Court has described the purpose of § 1983 as
"interpos[ing] the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people's federal rights."' 132 It may be surprising,
then, that although the lower federal courts have original
jurisdiction over § 1983 claims, they do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over them. 33 State courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction
over § 1983 claims.' 34 If the law's true purpose is to ensure the
federal courts alone protect the federal rights of citizens, and in this
context, protect them from any supposed inadequacy of state
judicial systems, Congress has never reserved the federal courts'
exclusive right to do so. This suggests Congress has faith in the
ability of state courts to fully and fairly adjudicate federal
claims. 135 Section 1983 is a federal remedy, but it does not require
a federal forum.
132. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (emphasis added).
133. Federal jurisdiction over 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arises from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2006): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." It
also arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (2006):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person: To redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States.
134. SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 2, at 19.
135. The fact that Congress has never abridged state court jurisdiction over §
1983 claims during the statute's long history outweighs any evidence that some
Congressmen viewed the supposed inadequacy of the state courts as one of the
main problems § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now § 1983) sought to
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The existence of concurrent state court jurisdiction over § 1983
claims also suggests the constitutional abuses § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 136 sought to curb were not based in the
handling of criminal cases against African Americans by state
actors, but were rather rooted in the severe deprivations African
Americans suffered outside the courtroom for which their
perpetrators were never punished. This position is supported by the
other sections of the Civil Rights Act 13 providing for (1) criminal
liability for conspiracies against the government and certain private
citizens; 138 (2) the authority of the President to use military force to
curtail violence and insurrection within the states; 39" (3) the
authority of the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
under certain circumstances;' 40 (4) the requirement that jurors take
an oath that they were not engaged in any conspiracies; "14 1 and (5)
142
civil liability for actors who are complicit with conspirators.
Thus, read in pari materia with the rest of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, § 1 was likely not aimed at impugning the competency and
neutrality of state officials working in the court system.

remedy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176-77 (1961) (relating the
problems several Congressmen saw with the state courts in dispensing justice
and recognizing the possibility of municipal liability in § 1983 claims),
overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Regardless, Justice Powell has noted that "[d]espite
differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal
constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to
assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States." Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) (emphasis added). Additionally,
Senator Edmunds, who managed the bill that later became the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, on the floor of the Senate, remarked that "[iut [the legislation] does not
undertake to interpose itself out of the regular order of the administration of law.
It does not attempt to deprive any State of the honor which is due to the
punishment of crime." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 697-98 (1871).
Hence, the full history of § 1983 recognizes the adequacy of state courts in
adjudicating federal claims.
136. Once again, the forerunner of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
137. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (the Civil Rights Act of
1871 contained a total of six sections).
138. Id. § 2.
139. Id. § 3.
140. Id. § 4.
141. Id. § 5.
142. Id. § 6.
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2. Official Immunities in § 1983 Actions IllustrateState Court
Adequacy
The continued existence and applicability of common law
doctrines of immunity in § 1983 cases 143 also suggest the statute's
history and purpose do not impugn the adequacy of the state courts
to adjudicate federal claims. Judicial officers are granted absolute
immunity from suit in § 1983 claims. 144 State prosecutors enjoy
absolute immunity in § 1983 claims when they have acted within
the court system even when acting with malice and without
probable cause. 148 Additionally, law enforcement officials are
cloaked with qualified immunity, 146 protecting them from liability
under § 1983 claims, except in cases where their behavior violates
"clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."' 47 Thus, even if a law enforcement
officer's actions against a criminal defendant are illegal and the
judge disregards them at the criminal trial, unless those actions are
clearly unconstitutional to a reasonable person, the law
enforcement officer cannot be liable in a subsequent § 1983
action. 148 This fact holds true regardless of whether a showing of
favorable termination is required to bring a collaterally-attacking §
1983 claim. While these immunity doctrines' 49 do not directly
reach the issue of the cognizability of claims, they indicate
Congress did not perceive the officials involved in state criminal
trials to be the problem § 1983 sought to address.

143. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) (stating that
immunities for judges and prosecutors that existed at Reconstruction-era
common law apply to § 1983 actions).
144. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
145. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976).
146. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556. It appears uncertain, however, whether
qualified immunity was always available to law enforcement officers at
Reconstruction-era common law. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646
(1987) (describing the "vagaries" of American common law). Still, it is clear
qualified immunity was available to law enforcement officers at common law to
some extent during that era. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)
(officers applying for arrest warrants were given qualified immunity at common
law when the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted).
147. Harlowv. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

148. See id.

149. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled by the
defendant. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
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3. The Aims of§ 1983 Espoused by the Supreme Court
While the jurisdictional and immunity analyses provide a clear
indication that Congress did not, in enacting § 1983, seek to
impugn the competency of the state courts in handling federal
claims the Court's discussion of the aims of § 1983 in Monroe v.
Pape's° appears at first to do just that. The Court described three
main aims of the § 1983 action in Monroe:15 ' (1) to "override
certain kind of state laws"; (2) to "provide a remedy where state
law was inadequate"; and (3) "to provide a federal remedy where
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice."' 5 2 The first aim was obviously directed at overturning
unconstitutional laws. State courts have the power to declare 53a
state law unconstitutional, either as applied or on its face.'
Because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983
claims, state criminal defendants who have a full and fair chance to
raise the issue of the unconstitutionality of the law under which they
have been accused or convicted should have no recourse to litigate
the same claim again merely because a federal court is also
competent to hear such a claim.
Finding that § 1983 "[provides] a remedy where state law [is]
inadequate,"' 54 the second aim of the legislation expounded by the
Court does not imply, on another front, that state courts are
inadequate venues to protect federal rights. Indeed, the Court in
Monroe would go on to say that "it is no answer that the State has
a law which if enforced would give relief,"' l 5 thereby suggesting
that no state tort action could ever be adequate. The Court's
reading of the second aim was directed then at the inability of state
tort actions alone to address the gravity of constitutional violations,
not at the adequacy of state criminal trials. Concededly, the
adequacy of state laws providing for tort recovery is an entirely
different question than the adequacy of state courts, the latter of
150. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961) (recognizing the
possibility of municipal liability in § 1983 claims), overruled on other grounds
by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
151. Id. at 167. The Court held for the first time in Monroe that state officers
could be liable under § 1983 even when their violations of another's federal
rights were not sanctioned by state law but were merely perpetrated under the
cloak of the state authority they possessed. See id. at 187.
152. Id. at 173-74.
153. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the

law is.").

154. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173.
155. Id. at 183.
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which are given a "passing grade" by the recognition of concurrent
57
jurisdiction 56 and the availability of official immunities. 1
The final aim of § 1983 espoused by the Court--"to provide a
federal remedy where state remedy, though adequate in theory,
was not available in practice"' 58-is perhaps more problematic
because it almost necessarily impugns the adequacy of the state
courts. Consider, however, a scenario set in the South during the
heyday of the Ku Klux Klan: an African American alleges that
some of his personal property has been seized by the police
without due process of law in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. State law provides for tort recovery, perhaps
on a theory of trespass to chattels or conversion. The case,
however, like many other cases of its kind, never really sees the
light of day, hence not being available in practice. There could
have been three primary reasons for this: (1) Klan violence and
intimidation techniques had the effect of preventing potential
plaintiffs from bringing such actions; (2) jurors in state court
proceedings were too prejudiced to dispense justice; or (3) public
officials involved in state court proceedings were too prejudiced to
dispense justice. Certainly, a combination of all three could have
been at play, but it would be helpful to address the reasons
individually. Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, other than
§ 1, along with the availability of official immunities, seem to have
been aimed at addressing them specifically.
First, if the reason an adequate tort remedy to constitutional
violations was available in theory but not in practice was because
of the violent tactics of Klan members, the Civil Rights Act of
1871 contained another provision to address such violence. Section
3 of the Act authorized the President to utilize military force to
curtail violence and insurrection within the states caused by
conspirators like the Klan.' 59 Second, if the problem was rooted in
the fact that some jurors were members, or sympathizers, of the
Klan, the Civil Rights Act sought to address their influence
through the requirement that jurors take an oath that they were not
60
part of any conspiracy to inhibit justice through the courts.1
Finally, if the problem of practical availability of a remedy was
found in the corruption of state officials in the court system,
156. See supra Part III.A. 1.
157. See supra Part III.A.2.
158. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
159. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13.
160. Id. § 5. The author does not suggest this requirement was always
adequate to curtail the influence of jurors sympathetic to the Klan but reminds
the reader that jurors are not a part of the appellate process by which decisions
may be reviewed and overturned.
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Congress could have rejected the immunities provided to those
parties under the common law and later jurisprudence. 161 This all
suggests, again, that § 1983162 was 63not aimed at addressing the
adequacy of state court proceedings.'
This proposed analysis notwithstanding, the meaning behind the
final aim espoused by the Court in Monroe is almost immediately
contradicted by its assertion that even if the state remedy was
adequate in theory and available in practice, the federal civil action
under § 1983 would still stand. 164 Hence, tort recovery through both
state and federal law is a perfectly permissible outcome. This
suggests that a full and fair chance to litigate a constitutional
violation, even if provided in the state court system, does not inhibit
the right to litigate that same question again in a § 1983 action; the §
1983 claim is cognizable. In such a circumstance, however, both
chances to litigate the claim are in a civil setting. When a defendant
gets a full and fair chance to argue his federal claims at his state
criminal trial, he does so against the backdrop of a burden of proof
165
carried by the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The plaintiff in a § 1983 claim must only prove his claim by a
preponderance of the evidence.' 66 Equity is offended when a
plaintiff can succeed on a lesser showing in a collaterally-attacking
§ 1983 action after the state has already succeeded on a greater
showing in a criminal trial.
B. Strong State Sovereignty Interests Demand Respect for State
Court Decisions
While the history and purpose of § 1983 offer no express
impediments to the application of the favorable termination
requirement to non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs bringing collaterallyattacking § 1983 claims, strong state sovereignty interests present
compelling reasons for its adoption. Inherent concepts of
161. See supraPart III.A.2.
162. Formerly § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
163. It has been argued that the second and third aims of § 1983 espoused by
the Court in Monroe are illusory in light of the substance of the congressional
debates on § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Eric H. Zagrans, "Under
Color Of' What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA.
L. REv. 499, 527, 559-60 (1984).
164. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (recognizing the possibility
of municipal liability in § 1983 claims), overruledon other grounds by Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
165. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
166. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (in the absence of any
overriding individual interests, preponderance of the evidence is the default
standard in civil suits).
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constitutional federalism, analogous rules and doctrines, and
concern for finality and consistency in judicial decision-making all
counsel against unfettered access to § 1983.
1. ConstitutionalFederalismAcknowledges the Importance of
State Sovereignty
Inherent concepts of federalism 67 in the United States
Constitution give a clear indication of the strong deference to be
afforded to state court decisions by the federal courts.' 68 In Article
III, § I of the Constitution, the judicial power is "vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."1 69 Justice Scalia has noted
the oddity of a position that would afford second-class standing to
the state courts in their protection of federal rights when the
Constitution does not require the creation of lower federal courts to
address such claims.' 70 The lower federal courts' lack of appellate
power over state court decisions 17 1 and the Supreme Court's highly
discretionary review of such cases 172 arise in part from this
underlying principle of federalism in the Constitution. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that federal and state courts are
"equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
[C]onstitution."' 173 Applying the favorable termination requirement
to a collaterally-attacking § 1983 plaintiff ensures respect for the
states' undertaking of this duty implicitly recognized by the
Constitution.
2. Rules andDoctrinesAnalogous to FavorableTermination
Support Its Adoption
The importance of federal court deference to state court
decisions is also evident in a number of congressional statutes and
judicial doctrines. These analogous rules support the application of
167. "Federalism" is a term describing "[tihe legal relationship and
distribution of power between the national and regional governments within a
federal system of government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 644 (8th ed. 2004).

168. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 723 (1992) (Scalia, J.,

concurring).
169. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
170. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 723.
171. The federal district courts are vested with original jurisdiction over
certain claims. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (federal question jurisdiction);
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (diversity jurisdiction).
172. See Supreme Court Case Selections Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 2(a)(b), 102 Stat. 662 (1988).
173. Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241,251 (1886).
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Heck's favorable termination requirement to non-habeas-eligible
plaintiffs bringing collaterally-attacking § 1983 actions by
recognizing the important state sovereignty interests at stake.
a. FederalDeference to State CourtDecisions on State Taxes
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1341 in order to prevent the
federal courts from hearing cases concerning state tax disputes
when state courts provide "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy" to
address those disputes. 174 This statute shares the same rationale as
the favorable termination requirement, namely, the recognition that
a full and fair chance to litigate a claim in a competent state court
supersedes any federal interests in adjudication. While 28 U.S.C. §
1341 deals exclusively with matters of state tax law as opposed to
the federal claims at issue in § 1983, the federal rights a nonhabeas-eligible plaintiff would most likely raise in his collaterallyattacking § 1983 action would be those applied against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thus themselves becoming matters of state law. 175 If states have
such a strong interest in the protection of their judicial decisions on
tax policies, they must have a greater interest in protecting the
weight and authority of their criminal convictions. A fortiori, a
non-habeas-eligible plaintiff bringing a collaterally-attacking §
1983 action should be required to demonstrate a favorable
termination to his underlying conviction.
b. Younger v. Harris Abstention Doctrine
The Supreme Court recognizes a "fundamental policy against
federal interference with state criminal prosecutions, ' 7 lending
additional analogous support to the adoption of the favorable
termination requirement when a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff
brings a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action. In Younger v. Harris,
the plaintiff sought injunctive relief against his pending state
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). The statute provides: "The district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State." Id.
175. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying the double
jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment against the states); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying the Fourth Amendment bar on unreasonable
searches and seizures against the states); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (applying the Sixth Amendment's right to a trial by jury in criminal cases
against the states).
176. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
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criminal prosecution.177 The Court held that federal intervention
would not be appropriate unless there was a threat of "irreparable
179
injury"'178 to the plaintiff that was "'both great and immediate."",
Non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs bringing collaterally-attacking §
1983 actions are not threatened with irreparable injury if they have
procedural outlets for review of their convictions. r 8° The other
18 1
avenues of favorable termination provide these outlets.
Additionally, since the collaterally-attacking plaintiff is no longer
incarcerated, he is no longer82 subject to any injury that may be
While the Younger abstention 183
called great or immediate.'
concerns pending state court proceedings, a state's interest in
protecting the final judgments of its criminal proceedings is more
184
substantial in light of judicial goals of finality and consistency.
The opportunity for continued litigation with the possibility of
monetary
recovery weakens the deterrent effect of the criminal
85
law.'

177. Id. at 39.
178. Id. at 46.
179. Id. (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 n.2 (1926)). The Court
did not address the applicability of the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(2006), which provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments." The Court has extended the applicability of the
Younger doctrine to include claims for declaratory relief Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U.S. 66 (1971). The Court in Heck suggested abstention might have been
appropriate had Heck brought his § 1983 claim during the pendency of his
criminal trial. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 n.8 (1994).
180. See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (reasoning
habeas corpus is not the only procedural vehicle to challenge a conviction).
181. See Heck, 512 U.S. at486-87.
182. Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the Court in Spencer, dismissed
injury to reputation in such a situation as non-concrete. Spencer v. Kemna, 523
U.S. 1, 16 n.8 (1998). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-13 (1976) (mere
injury to reputation not a deprivation of a liberty or property interest).
183. In County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., the Court described
abstention as:
[A]n extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court
to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the
obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in
the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to
the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.
360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
184. See infra Part III.B.3.
185. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
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c. FullFaith and Credit: Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel
The preclusion doctrines of res judicata 86 and collateral
estoppel, 87 like the favorable termination requirement, serve the
important state interests of properly expending judicial resources,
preventing the possibility of diametrically opposed judicial
decisions, and encouraging reliance on the finality of judicial
decisions. 88 The full faith and credit statute' 8 9 requires federal
courts to give state court judgments the same preclusive effect
those judgments would receive by the courts of the state in which
they were rendered. 190 Consequently, as long as a party has a full
and fair chance to litigate his claim in state court, federal
preclusion becomes a matter of the applicability of res judicata or
collateral estoppel under state law. These preclusions may apply
even when a § 1983 claimant was a criminal defendant in the
underlying state court proceedings. 191 Thus, many cases in which a
186. "Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)
(citing Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)). Res judicata is
commonly called claim preclusion. See id. at 94 n.5.
187. "Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or
law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the
issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case."
Id. at 94 (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). Collateral
estoppel is commonly called issue preclusion. See id.at 94 n.5.
188. Id. at 94. These doctrines also serve the interest of the parties in limiting
expenses related to litigation. Id.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) provides:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the
seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted
in other courts within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed,
if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the
said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same fill faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
190. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94-95.
191. Id. at 103-04. The Court found nothing in § 1983's language or
legislative history indicating Congress intended to give state criminal judgments
less weight than state civil judgments. Id. at 104. Additionally, federal courts are
not bound by the doctrine of mutuality, which prevents non-parties to underlying
litigation from claiming preclusion in later litigation of which they are a part.
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non-habeas-eligible plaintiff brings a collaterally-attacking § 1983
action may be precluded if state law provides an expansive
definition of what constitutes a "claim" or "issue." A non-habeaseligible plaintiffs full and fair chance to litigate his federal claims
during his underlying trial and appeal makes relitigation of those
same claims in a § 1983 action untenable absent a showing of
favorable termination.
d Rooker-Feldman Bar on FederalDistrictCourtReview
State sovereignty interests supporting the adoption of the
favorable termination requirement in collaterally-attacking § 1983
actions brought by non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs are manifest in
the landscape of appellate review as well. The Supreme Court is
vested with the right of appellate
review of federal issues decided
19 3
by the high court of any state. 192 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
recognizes that because federal district courts almost exclusively
exercise original jurisdiction over claims, 194 they are inadequate
venues for reviewing state court decisions. 95 While success on 96a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 action in a federal district court'
would not, in fact, overturn the plaintiffs underlying state court
conviction such that the decision may be considered a true

See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (permitting offensive
use of issue preclusion); Blonder-Tongue Lab, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971) (permitting defensive use of issue preclusion).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of
any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any
title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or
authority exercised under, the United States.
193. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
194. See supra note 171. Federal district courts are given appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments of bankruptcy courts, however. 28 U.S.C. §
158 (2006). Regardless, bankruptcy courts are federal, not state courts.
195. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.
196. While the analogous bar of Rooker-Feldman is only applicable to federal
district courts, the author does not imply that a non-habeas-eligible plaintiff
bringing a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action may bring his claim in a state court
without showing a favorable termination to his underlying conviction.
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appellate review, 197 the effect of the decision, in practice, would be
to impugn the validity of that conviction. The § 1983 action would
scrutinize the sufficiency of a state criminal conviction through the
means of what may be deemed a quasi-appellate tort action.
Application of the favorable termination requirement to
collaterally-attacking § 1983 actions brought by non-habeaseligible plaintiffs safeguards the integrity of the state court
conviction by preventing the circumvention of appropriate means
of appellate review.
e. FederalHabeas Deference to a State Court'sFourth
Amendment Decisions
1 98
The Supreme Court's deferential ruling in Stone v. Powell
also analogously illustrates the propriety of the favorable
termination requirement in light of substantial state sovereignty
interests. In that case, the Court rejected any supposed right of a
state prisoner who had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate his
Fourth Amendment claim in a state court to argue deprivation of
the exclusionary rule as grounds for relief in federal habeas
corpus. 199 In a footnote to his majority opinion, Justice Powell
highlighted the majority's faith in the state courts and the respect
to be shown their decisions under the Constitution:
Despite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of
some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume
that there now exists a general lack of appropriate
sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate
courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts,
safeguard personal
have a constitutional obligation 20 to
0
liberties and to uphold federal law.

It has been argued that the state interests at stake when a
prisoner-plaintiff utilizes a collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim are
much greater than the interests at stake when the plaintiff is not
habeas-eligible. 20 1 In the former scenario, the state could be liable
for monetary damages and would likely be forced to release the
197. Section 1983 "creates a species of tort liability," not criminal appellate
review. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).
198. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
199. Id. at 494.
200. Id. at 494 n.35.
201. Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?,
121 HARv. L. REv. 868, 888 (2008).
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°2
plaintiff2010]
if he was successful.2 OTE267
In the latter scenario, the state
could merely be liable for damages if it lost, as the underlying
conviction would still stand, and the plaintiff will have already
served his time or paid his fine. This argument misses the point,
however. The full and fair chance to litigate the claims at issue, as
proposed in Stone and inherent in the other rules and doctrines
above, is the real interest at play. Application of the favorable
termination requirement to non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs bringing
collaterally-attacking § 1983 claims merely ensures there is no
excessive right to litigate.

3. The State 's Interest in the Finality and Consistency of Its
JudicialDecisions
Favorable termination serves the important judicial goals of
"finality and consistency." 20 3 These goals are rooted in a deep
respect for the competency of underlying court decisions. The
Supreme Court highlighted this point succinctly in an 1836
decision:
There is no principle of law better settled, than that every
act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed
to have been rightly done, till the contrary appears: this rule
applies as well to every judgment or decree, rendered in the
various stages of their proceedings from the initiation to
their completion, as to their adjudication that the plaintiff
has a right of action. Every matter adjudicated, becomes a
part of their record; which thenceforth proves itself,
without referring to the evidence on which it has been
adjudged.2 °4
The avenues of favorable termination provide a party with
sufficient options in contesting what he alleges to be a federal
rights violation undergirding his criminal conviction. One can
imagine the length of time a federal issue, which a party had an
opportunity to fully and fairly adjudicate in a state criminal trial
and appeal, would continue to be litigated if given the opportunity
to enter a federal forum. To be sure, such an extended period of
litigation would be justified if the plaintiff demonstrated a
favorable termination to his underlying conviction, as state
sovereignty interests could then no longer be collaterally

202. See supra text accompanying note 28.
203. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 485 (1994).
204. Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449, 472 (1836).
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compromised. In the absence of such a showing, however, concerns
for finality and consistency should reign supreme.
Collaterally-attacking § 1983 claims are not cognizable under
the common law principle that "civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments. 2 °5 The allowance of such actions and their
possibility of success would undermine the sanctity of the criminal
trial process as the primary means of publicly establishing the guilt
or affirming the innocence of individuals within the United
States.2 6 In Heck, Justice Souter argued that the "broad language"
of § 1983 cannot be narrowed by the common law, and thus the
opportunity for a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action by a nonhabeas-eligible plaintiff cannot be constrained without express
statutory intent.
The problem with this reasoning is that the
Court recognizes the common law does narrow the "broad
language" of § 1983 through the availability of judicial and
prosecutorial immunities.2 0 Additionally, the intentional statutory
omission of exclusive federal jurisdiction over § 1983 claims
demonstrates a congressional understanding and endorsement of
the fact that these federal claims can be given a full and fair
treatment by the state courts. 1°9 A favorable termination
requirement, then, does no more than prevent litigation from
overflowing beyond the bounds of reasonableness.
Justice Souter described the inability of a non-habeas-eligible
plaintiff to succeed on a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action
without showing a favorable termination to his underlying
conviction as a "patent anomaly" when compared with the ability
of a former prisoner to succeed under § 1983 after release through
federal habeas corpus.2 10 There is nothing anomalous to this
scenario, though, since both parties are required to make the exact
same showing: favorable termination. The favorable termination
requirement outlined in Heck recognizes four possibilities in
demonstrating that a conviction has been, for all intents and
purposes, invalidated.2 1' To look to the availability of federal

205. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
206. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (citing Delaware v.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
207. Heck, 512 U.S. at 502 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Dennis v. Higgins,
498 U.S. 439, 443, 445 (1991)).
208. See supra Part III.A.2.

209. See supra Part III.A. 1.
210. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,20-21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring).

211. The four possibilities are: (1) reversal on direct appeal; (2) expunging
by executive order; (3) declaration of invalidity by a state tribunal authorized to
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habeas corpus alone, isolated from the other three avenues of
recourse, appears to disregard the real concerns the Court had in
Heck. The Court sought to make sure there were sufficient avenues
to show favorable termination in every circumstance, even though
each avenue might not be available in every circumstance. It seems
then that, "as a matter of law," 212 it would never be impossible for
a plaintiff to show a favorable termination to his conviction
because of the availability of the appellate process and the
possibility of an executive pardon. Consistency in the application
of Heck's favorable termination requirement, then, works to ensure
finality and consistency in judicial decisions.
C. Lingering Questions ofFederalHabeasInteraction Caution
Against Cognizability
If Justice Souter's position were adopted, however, there are
many questions to consider.2 13 First, should a convict who had the
opportunity to petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus while in
prison, did not do so, and whose habeas claim was barred at the
time of his release by the statute of limitations, still be allowed to
bring a § 1983 action when released? Second, should a convict
who had the opportunity to petition for a writ of federal habeas
corpus while in prison and did not do so, but whose habeas claim
was not barred by the statute of limitations at the time of his
release, still be allowed to bring a § 1983 action after his release?
Third, should a convict who had a pending petition for a writ of
federal habeas corpus at the time of his release, which was
subsequently dismissed for mootness, still be allowed to bring a §
1983 action after his release? 214 Fourth, should a convict who had
no opportunity to petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus while
in prison, because, as a practical matter, he was not in prison long
enough to exhaust state remedies, still be allowed to bring a § 1983
action after his release? Fifth, should a convict who was convicted
and fined, but never imprisoned, still be allowed to bring a § 1983
action?

make such a determination; and (4) a calling into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
212. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring).
213. All of these scenarios assume that the plaintiff has not procured a
favorable termination to his underlying conviction and is seeking to bring a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 action.
214. This is the exact scenario applicable to the plaintiff in Spencer, although
he had not yet filed a § 1983 action.
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Undoubtedly, Justice Souter would answer with a categorical
"yes" to the questions presented by the third, fourth, and fifth
scenarios. 215 The second scenario is more problematic, but it is
likely that if the plaintiffs opportunity at a federal forum had not
passed because of habeas' statute of limitations, but was merely cut
off by release of the prisoner, Justice Souter would still allow the
potential plaintiff the opportunity to bring a § 1983 action. This
scenario seems especially difficult because it could never be
determined whether the party actually intended to petition for
federal habeas review in prison before the statute of limitations ran.
If a plaintiff had the opportunity to address his claims in a
federal forum, yet waived that opportunity by allowing the statute
of limitations to run, as is the case in the first scenario, it would be
surprising if Justice Souter acknowledged the plaintiffs right to
another bite at the federal apple. Yet at the time Heck was
decided, 2 16 there was no statute of limitations on federal habeas
corpus review. 2 17 The time restrictions on federal habeas corpus
review did not appear until the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 218 Justice Souter must have
been operating under one of two assumptions: either (1) that §
1983 was so far reaching that it would not matter if the plaintiff
ignored his opportunity at a federal forum through federal habeas
corpus while in prison or (2) the plaintiff waived his right to a
federal forum once released from prison if he failed to take
advantage of a reasonable opportunity while in prison to petition
for a writ of federal habeas corpus. The second assumption begs
the troubling question of what constitutes a "reasonable
opportunity."
The above hypothetical scenarios illustrate the potential
problems that arise when making one federal remedy for a class of
persons solely dependent on the availability of another, instead of
evaluating all remedies in context with one another. While a §
1983 action may have broad reach, that reach is not unlimited. A
full and fair chance to litigate claims in a forum acceptable to the
federal remedy should foreclose the possibility of further litigation
of those claims absent a showing of favorable termination. The
215. See generally Spencer, 523 U.S. at 19 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing
that there should be no favorable termination requirement to a person situated in
scenario (3)); Heck, 512 U.S. at 491-503 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that
there should be no favorable termination requirement to a person situated in
either scenario (4) or (5)).
216. Heck was decided on June 24, 1994.
217. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528 (2003).
218. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 & 28 U.S.C.).
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Heck requirement recognizes this ideal by guarding against the
"creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or
identical transaction ' ' 2 19 and safeguarding the practice of judicial
economy by finding such exhausted claims to be non-cognizable.
D. Exceptions andLimitations to the FavorableTermination
Requirement
In light of the foregoing findings, 220 a non-habeas-eligible
plaintiff bringing a collaterally-attacking § 1983 action must
demonstrate a favorable termination to his underlying conviction
insofar as he had a full and fair chance to litigate his federal claims
as defenses in his underlying conviction. Justice Souter outlined a
scenario in which a full and fair chance to litigate federal claims
was not available to the plaintiff during state criminal proceedings,
presenting a true "patent anomaly",22 1 in the distribution of justice
that demands the setting aside of the favorable termination
requirement, however: a convicted party, after having served his
prison term or paid a fine, learns
,,222 that "state officials deliberately
withheld exculpatory material
at his trial.
223 the Supreme Court contemplated an
In Brady v. Maryland,
even more expansive scenario when it held "that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the goodfaith or badfaith
of the prosecution.,224 Later Court decisions have extended the
rule to include evidence not requested by the defense 225 and that
known only to the police.226 Such a due process violation occurs
only if disclosure would have resulted in a "reasonable
probability" that a verdict favorable to the defendant would have
been reached.227
To be sure, evidence of "actual innocence" as to a plaintiffs
underlying conviction, absent a showing state actors withheld that
evidence, would not be grounds to lay aside the favorable

219. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484.
220. See supra Part III.A-C.
221. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1998)
concurring).
222. Heck, 512 U.S. at 502 (Souter, J., concurring).
223. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
224. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
225. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
226. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
227. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).

(Souter, J.,
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termination requirement. 2 2 Section 1983 actions are only
concerned with the violation of an individual's federally protected
229
rights

by

actors

operating

under

color

of

state

law.

Consequently, an unawareness of innocence by the courts is not
grounds for recovery and is certainly not indicative of the absence
of a full and fair chance to litigate the issues known to the parties.
Conclusive proof of actual innocence can be utilized, however, as a
vehicle to possibly gain a favorable termination through an
executive order expunging the conviction. 230 The issue of actual
innocence presents a much more troublesome situation when the
pleading party is still in jail, though, as the deprivation of his
a reviewable
liberty despite actual
23 1 innocence may not be
constitutional injury.

If, however, under the due process issues espoused in Brady
and its progeny, a party does not have a full and fair chance to
litigate his federal claims because he was deprived by state actors
of exculpatory evidence material to his underlying conviction, and
this fact is not discovered until after the exhaustion of available
remedies in the state criminal appeals process, 232 the favorable
termination requirement has no place in barring recovery under §
1983. To find otherwise would leave such a party in a truly
anomalous situation: the absence of a federal or state venue to
address state actors' alleged deprivations of his federal rights. One
cannot have a full and fair chance to litigate his claims when, by
the negligence or deception of others, his pursuit of those claims is
unlawfully thwarted. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia apparently
failed to account for this real possibility in his framing of the issues
at stake.
Allowing for an exception to the applicability of the favorable
termination requirement in collaterally-attacking § 1983 actions in
the above situation serves a number of important purposes. First, it
allows the party alleging a federal rights violation a federal remedy
by which he can adjudicate his claim. The § 1983 plaintiff could
still bring his claim in federal or state court, however. 2 33 Second, a
228. Cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (reasoning that "actual
innocence" is not a constitutional claim).
229. See supra note 1.
230. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 417.
231. See id. at 400 (noting federal habeas courts do not review questions of
fact, but claims of unconstitutional incarceration).
232. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682;
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83, 87 (1963).

233. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 regarding state court concurrent
jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.
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favorable ruling for the plaintiff in such a § 1983 action bolsters
his ability to receive a favorable termination to his underlying
conviction if he has not already received one. The practical
likelihood that the state executive or a state tribunal so authorized
would expunge the plaintiff's underlying conviction is increased
upon a showing that a federal tribunal has recognized the federal
law deficiencies manifest in that conviction. Third, public
perception of the implicit fairness of the judicial process is
bolstered by recognition that the appearance of truth will have its
day in court. Finally, the availability of a full and fair adjudication
of alleged federal law violations under a § 1983 action helps
ensure guilty parties ultimately feel the weight of their actions not
only in their pocketbooks, but in the public notice of their fault as
well. Moreover, the natural deterrent effect such an exception
would have on the negligent and intentional mishandling of
evidence in the future seems obvious.
Such a "middle ground" appears to address the inherent
limitations of the two positions espoused by Justices Scalia and
Souter, respectively. It is a workable remedy to the infighting of
the Court and the confusion of the circuits. It recognizes that a full
and fair chance to litigate one's federal claims in an adequate
venue is all that § 1983 requires and ensures the opportunity of
every party subject to a criminal conviction just that chancenothing more, nothing less.235
The application of Heck's favorable termination requirement to
non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs bringing collaterally-attacking §
1983 claims has one major drawback. Inevitably, there will be
instances in which a convicted criminal's federal claims were not
justly adjudicated through the state criminal judicial process.
Given the safeguards of the appeals process, though, including the
opportunity to apply for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court and the possibility of an executive check through the pardon
process, it would be difficult to argue that such injustices are
simply ignored or are the product of mere state indifference. At
some point, the recognition that a full and fair chance to litigate
has been provided turns the balance in favor of finality. Obviously,
the availability of § 1983 without an obligation to show a favorable
termination is not an assurance of success in that action. This
reality highlights the undeniable value of a full and fair chance to
litigate. If the aim of the judicial process is perfection in judgment,
rather than the opportunity for perfection in judgment, the courts,
234.
235.

Justice Souter's position.
Justice Scalia's (apparent) position.

682

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

and the men and women party to them, will find themselves
forever frustrated by the unattainable.
Exempting non-habeas-eligible § 1983 plaintiffs bringing
collaterally-attacking actions from a showing of favorable
termination to their underlying convictions when they have not had
a full and fair chance to litigate their claims, as outlined above,
provides an effective means of safeguarding the integrity of the
judicial process. While this exception to the favorable termination
requirement cannot ensure the correctness of the decisions made
by the courts considering parties' federal claims, it does ensure a
full and fair opportunity to have those claims heard.
IV. CONCLUSION

The circuit courts of appeals are split over whether a
collaterally-attacking § 1983 claim brought by a non-habeaseligible plaintiff is cognizable. In light of the history and purpose
of § 1983, important state sovereignty interests, and lingering
questions of federal habeas interaction, a non-habeas-eligible §
1983 plaintiff should be required to show a "favorable
termination" to his underlying criminal conviction when his civil
suit would necessarily attack the validity of his criminal conviction
or sentence. However, for equitable reasons, this rule should not
apply when state actors withheld exculpatory evidence from the
plaintiff material to his underlying conviction, and such is not
discovered until after the exhaustion of available remedies in the
state criminal appeals process. The favorable termination
requirement recognizes the reality of § 1983 as a tort remedy that
cannot override a full and fair chance to litigate identical claims in
a state criminal proceeding, without barring claims of which a
given plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of that full and fair chance
by state actors. This "middle ground" compromise of the views
espoused by Justices Scalia and Souter is fair in theory and
workable in practice.
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